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We review a variety of empirical findings consistent with the general thesis that the 
affective system of judgment and decision making is inherently anchored in the present. Building 
on this thesis, we advance the specific hypothesis that affective feelings are relied upon more 
(weighted more heavily) in judgments whose outcomes and targets are closer to the present than 
in those whose outcomes and targets are temporally more distant. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
results from five experiments show that temporal proximity (a) amplifies the relative preference 
for options that are affectively superior, and (b) increases the effects of incidental affect on 
evaluations. These effects are observed when compared to a more distant future as well as to a 
more distant past, and (c) they appear to be linked to a greater perceived information value of 
affective feelings in judgments whose outcomes and targets are closer to the present. Theoretical 
implications are discussed.  
  
Consumer judgments and decisions can be made either in a largely cognitive, reason-
based manner—by assessing, weighing, and combining attribute information into an overall 
evaluative judgment—or in a largely affective, feeling-based manner, by inspecting one’s 
momentary feelings toward the options (Pham 1998; Schwarz and Clore 2007). An emerging 
body of evidence suggests that the two modes of judgment and decision making may tap into 
separate systems: (a) a reason-based, analytical system and (b) a feeling-based, affective system 
(Epstein and Pacini 1999; Strack and Deutsch 2004). Whereas the judgment characteristics of the 
reason-based system are rather well established (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998), those of the 
affective system have more recently begun to emerge (see Pham 2007 for a review). For example, 
compared to judgments based on the reason-based system, judgments based on the affective 
system tend to be (a) rendered faster (Pham et al. 2001; Verplanken, Hofstee, and Janssen 1998; 
Zajonc 1980), (b) more polarized (Ratner and Herbst 2005; Sinaceur, Heath, and Cole 2005), (c) 
more holistic (Epstein 1990; Finucane et al. 2000), (d) more context-dependent (Hsee et al. 2003; 
Mellers et al. 1997), (e) more consistent both within and across individuals (Lee, Amir, and 
Ariely 2009; Pham et al. 2001), and (f) less sensitive to numerical quantities (Hsee and 
Rottenstreich 2004).  
The purpose of this research is to highlight and substantiate an important characteristic of 
the affective system of judgment and decision making. We argue that the affective system is 
inherently anchored in the present. In this article, we first review a variety of empirical findings 
that are consistent with this general thesis. We then offer a novel proposition that derives from 
the general thesis that affect is a decision system of the present. Specifically, we propose that 
affective feelings are relied upon more (weighted more heavily) in decisions whose outcomes are 
 closer to the present than in decisions whose outcomes are more distant in time, whether future 
or past. Consistent with this proposition, results from five experiments involving a variety of 
decision domains and tasks show that outcome proximity to the present (a) amplifies the relative 
preference for options that are affectively superior, and (b) increases the effects of incidental 
affect on evaluations. These effects are observed when compared to both a more distant future 
and a more distant past. Additional results suggest that (c) these effects are linked to a greater 
perceived information value of affective feelings in decisions whose outcomes are closer to the 
present. Taken together with previous empirical findings (reviewed in the next section), our 
results point to a specific orientation of the affective system toward the present.  
PRIOR FINDINGS CONSISTENT WITH A PRESENT ORIENTATION OF THE 
AFFECTIVE SYSTEM 
To the best of our knowledge, the idea that affect is a decision system inherently 
anchored in the present has not been explicitly formulated as such. However, a variety of 
findings from different streams of literature seem to be consistent with this general thesis. These 
include findings indicating that (a) affect is experienced more intensely in relation to outcomes 
that are close to the present; (b) certain emotional areas of the brain are engaged only in 
decisions involving immediate outcomes; and (c) affect tends to promote impatience. These 
previous findings are briefly reviewed below (see Table 1). 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
Proximity to the Present Intensifies Affective Experiences 
 A number of studies have shown that affect tends to be experienced most intensely when 
outcomes are closer to the present. In an early demonstration of this phenomenon, participants 
were asked to rate the intensity of their emotional reactions to various events should these events 
 occur at different points in time both in the future and in the past (Ekman and Lundberg 1971). 
Using parametric scaling methods, the authors found that self-reported emotional intensity 
peaked when the event was set close to the present and decreased at a quasi-exponential rate 
when the event was set further away either in the future or in the past. Whereas the time horizons 
examined in Ekman and Lundberg’s (1971) studies spanned decades and even centuries, similar 
results have been obtained recently by Van Boven, White, and Huber (2009) with much shorter 
time horizons involving several minutes or even seconds. Other findings show that because 
emotional reactions intensify with the temporal proximity of the event, their effects on judgments 
and behaviors are stronger when the event is nearer in time (Huber et al. 2011; Van Boven et al. 
2012). For example, Van Boven and colleagues (2012) found that many participants who had 
agreed to tell a joke in public several days earlier subsequently “chickened out” just minutes 
before the actual performance. This is presumably because participants tended to underestimate 
their anxiety related to performing in public when they made their original commitment and the 
performance was still a distant event. When the actual performance drew near, participants’ 
anxiety increased substantially. It has also been observed that because the emotional experience 
of events that are closer in time is generally more intense, people correspondingly tend to 
perceive events that are experienced more intensely as more proximate in time (Van Boven et al. 
2010). 
Emotional Areas of the Brain Are Only Activated by Immediate Outcomes   
Recent neuroscience studies point to a possible biological link between emotional 
experiences and the present. Using fMRI, McClure et al. (2004) found that in intertemporal 
choice tasks, areas of the brain that are closely associated with emotions, such as the limbic area 
and the medial prefrontal cortex, become activated only in choices that involve immediate 
 monetary outcomes (see also Hariri et al. 2006). Similar results have been observed with 
nonmonetary rewards (McClure et al. 2007). Thus, not only are emotions experienced more 
intensely when outcomes are closer to the present, but the emotional neural system may respond 
distinctively to decisions situated in the present.  
Stimulus Affect Promotes Impatience  
 A large number of studies from various literatures have shown that the experience of 
affect toward a stimulus promotes myopic behavior toward this stimulus. For example, studies 
based on the delay-of-gratification paradigm have shown that affect-rich access to the sensory 
properties of rewarding objects (e.g., the physical presence of an appetizing marshmallow) tends 
to promote impatience to obtain these objects for immediate gratification, and this at the cost of 
receiving even more rewarding objects at a later point in time (e.g., two marshmallows; see 
Mischel and Ebbesen 1970; Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss 1972). In contrast, affect-poor 
representations of the same objects (e.g., thinking of the marshmallow as a cloud) tend to 
promote greater patience and ability to delay gratification (Mischel and Baker 1975; see also 
Shiv and Fedhorikhin 1999 and Read and Leeuwen 1998 for related results). More recent studies 
show that the impatient tendencies triggered by affect-rich stimuli can even carry over to 
subsequent unrelated tasks. For example, exposure to affect-rich pictures of attractive women in 
bikinis (for heterosexual men) or appetizing desserts has been found to promote impatience in 
subsequent choices between smaller immediate monetary rewards and larger delayed monetary 
rewards (Li 2008; Van den Bergh, Dewitte, and Warlop 2008).   
 The common explanation for people’s myopic tendencies with respect to affect-rich 
objects is based on the differential accessibility of current versus delayed affective reactions 
(reviewed earlier). Because the immediate feelings that one experiences in relation to a present 
 stimulus are typically more accessible and intense than those that one can only imagine in 
relation to a future outcome, affect-rich situations tend to steer preferences toward myopic 
options that are immediately rewarding compared to farsighted options that are superior in the 
long run (Loewenstein 1996; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999).  
Recap: A Consistent Pattern of Orientation toward the Present  
In summary, a variety of diverse research findings seem to indicate a distinct connection 
between the affective system and an orientation toward the present. First, affective responses 
tend to intensify as outcomes draw closer. Second, certain emotional neural structures seem to be 
uniquely activated by outcomes that are immediate. Finally, affective responses tend to trigger 
impatience in intertemporal choice, favoring short-term options over long-term options that are 
objectively superior.   
We believe that these various empirical regularities reflect a more fundamental 
underlying property of the affective system: an inherent anchoring of this system in the present. 
We speculate that this fundamental property of the affective system originates in its older 
evolutionary roots. It is generally believed that the affective system is an ancient system (e.g., 
Epstein 1994; Plutchik 1980) that “has been sculpted by the hammer and chisel of adaptation and 
natural selection to differentiate hostile from hospitable stimuli and to respond accordingly” (pg. 
839, Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson 1999). Presumably, throughout our evolutionary history, 
this system has guided our ancestors through choices that they faced in their immediate, present 
environment (Cosmides and Tooby 2000; Pham 2007). One would therefore expect that it has 
retained a specific orientation toward the present (Pham 2004, 2007). If the affective system is 
indeed a decision system of the present, it should exhibit additional characteristics beyond the 
ones already identified by previous literature (and summarized above). Here, we propose that the 
 affective system promotes a greater reliance on affective feelings in decisions whose outcomes 
are closer to the present.  
DIFFERENTIAL RELIANCE ON AFFECT WHEN OUTCOMES ARE CLOSE TO VERSUS 
DISTANT FROM THE PRESENT 
Our Specific Hypothesis 
In previous findings, the link between affect and the present was established primarily by 
the differential accessibility and intensity of affective responses across time. We propose that, in 
addition to a differential accessibility of affective responses in decisions whose outcomes are 
close versus distant, the affective system triggers a differential reliance on these responses. That 
is, even if the accessibility and intensity of the feelings (i.e., their subjective “scale value”) were 
to be held constant, these feelings would still carry a greater weight on judgments and decisions 
whose outcomes are proximate than on judgments and decisions whose outcomes are temporally 
more distant. For example, we would predict that a person’s incidental mood state (i.e., a given 
affective response with a specific scale value) would tend to exert a stronger influence on this 
person’s judgments if the outcome is proximate than if the outcome is more distant. Therefore, 
we propose that when outcomes are closer to the present not only do people usually experience 
affective feelings more intensely (as amply demonstrated by previous research reviewed above), 
they actually rely more on these feelings (as shall be demonstrated in our studies). We believe 
that the differential reliance on affective feelings as a function of temporal proximity is similar to 
the differential reliance on feelings as a function of their perceived information value (Schwarz 
and Clore 2007; Pham 1998, 2004). Specifically, when outcomes are proximate, people tend to 
 rely on their feelings as if these feelings were more informative; when outcomes are more distant, 
people tend to ignore their feelings and may even discount them.  
 Preliminary support for this hypothesis comes from recent findings indicating that a given 
affective experience may indeed exert stronger influence on decisions involving immediate 
outcomes than on decisions involving more temporally distant outcomes. For example, Pronin, 
Olivola, and Kennedy (2008) found that participants who expected to have to drink a disgusting 
beverage—an emotionally unpleasant thought—were willing to drink less if the consumption 
was to occur immediately than if it was to occur in a few months. According to the authors, this 
is because participants paid more attention to their internal subjective experiences when making 
decisions involving an immediate consumption than when making decisions involving a more 
distant consumption—an interpretation that is generally consistent with our notion of a greater 
reliance on affective feelings when outcomes are proximate. In another study, Peters and 
colleagues (2012) asked participants how much they would be willing to pay to protect their 
personal possessions in a rented apartment. If the possessions were described in an affect-poor 
manner, participants were understandably more willing to protect them under a two-year 
apartment lease than under a one-year lease. However, if the possessions were described in an 
affect-rich manner, participants were paradoxically more willing to protect them under a one-
year lease than under a two-year lease. Thus, participants seemed to pay more attention to their 
affective reactions when the relevant time horizon was shorter, which is also broadly consistent 
with the notion of a greater weighting of affective feelings when outcomes are proximate.  
 In sum, we propose that over and above the tendency of the affective system to react 
more strongly to outcomes that are close to the present, there is a further tendency of this system 
to attach greater weight to affective inputs when outcomes are close to the present. It is 
 interesting to relate this proposition with those of construal level theory (CLT; Trope, Liberman, 
and Wakslak 2007; Trope and Liberman 2003), which has recently received a considerable 
amount of attention in consumer research. According to CLT, the temporal proximity or distance 
of an event fundamentally changes how this event is represented in people’s minds. Events that 
are temporally distant tend to be mentally represented in a more abstract and decontextualized 
fashion, with a focus on the essential characteristics of the events—a notion referred to as 
“higher-level construal.” In contrast, events that are temporally close tend to be represented in a 
more concrete and contextualized fashion that includes incidental characteristics of the events—a 
notion referred to as “lower-level construal.” With respect to judgments and decisions, a central 
proposition of CLT is that temporal distance increases the relative weight attached to abstract 
and essential (“high-level”) features of the options compared to their concrete and nonessential 
(“low-level”) features. Temporal proximity is posited to have the opposite effect, increasing the 
relative weight attached to lower-level features. To the extent that affect is generally considered 
to be more concrete, visceral, and context-specific (Epstein and Pacini 1999; Metcalfe and 
Mischel 1999)—that is, in CLT terms, “lower level”—one would predict from CLT that 
temporal proximity would generally increase the weight attached to affective feelings in 
judgments and decisions, a prediction that is consistent with our general thesis. However, under 
certain conditions, CLT’s predictions may depart from ours, as shall be discussed later in this 
article. 
Overview of the Studies 
Our main hypothesis—that affective feelings are relied upon more (weighted more 
heavily) in decisions whose outcomes are closer to the present than in similar decisions whose 
outcomes are temporally more distant—was tested in five lab experiments involving more than 
 630 student participants. A variety of evaluative tasks and decision domains were examined 
across studies. In each study, we manipulated both (a) participants’ feelings toward the options at 
the time of making the decision and (b) the temporal proximity of the outcome associated with 
the decision. Our procedure was designed to vary the temporal proximity of the outcome without 
substantially changing the intensity of the feelings associated with the options.  
Experiment 1 shows that in a choice between an affectively superior option and a 
cognitively superior option, preference for the affectively superior option is greater when the 
outcome is to occur in a near future than when it is to occur in a more distant future. Consistent 
with the idea that it is indeed the reliance on affective feelings that increases with temporal 
proximity of the outcome, experiment 2 shows that incidental mood states have stronger mood-
congruent influence on behavioral intentions toward the target when the outcome is to be 
realized in a near future than when it is to be realized in a more distant future.  
Whereas the first two experiments test the main hypothesis prospectively, by comparing 
the effects of affect under near- versus distant-future outcomes, the next two experiments test 
this hypothesis retrospectively, by comparing the effects of affect on options related to a recent 
versus distant past. Both experiments 3 and 4 show that incidental mood states have a stronger 
mood-congruent effect on target evaluations when the target is associated with a recent past than 
when it is associated with a more distant past. A final experiment indicates that the tendency to 
rely more on one’s momentary feelings when outcomes are proximate (as opposed to more 
distant) is contingent on the perceived information value of the feelings. This tendency is greater 
when feelings are relevant for the decision at hand than when feelings are less relevant. This 
contingency is consistent with the idea that the basic phenomenon may be linked to the perceived 
informativeness of feelings when outcomes are proximate versus temporally distant.   
 EXPERIMENT 1: EFFECTS OF AFFECTIVE SUPERIORITY FOR NEAR- VERSUS 
DISTANT-FUTURE OUTCOMES 
This first experiment tests the basic prediction that in making a decision consumers are 
more likely to rely on their integral feelings toward the options when the outcome is closer to the 
present than when it is temporally more distant. The prediction was tested in the context of a 
choice between two apartments: one that was affectively superior and one that was functionally 
superior. Although all participants were asked to make their choice immediately, in one 
condition the apartment was chosen for the near future, whereas in the other condition it was 
chosen for a more distant future. It was predicted that participants choosing between the two 
apartments for the near future would exhibit a greater relative preference for the affectively 
superior apartment than participants choosing for a more distant future.  
Method 
Design. Participants in this study (and all subsequent studies) were university students 
who volunteered in exchange for a monetary compensation. They were asked to choose between 
two apartments to rent after graduation: one that was designed to be affectively superior and one 
that was designed to be functionally superior. The main manipulation was the temporal 
proximity of the graduation and hence the apartment’s rental period. In one condition, the 
graduation was to occur in a few weeks; in the other condition, the graduation was to occur the 
following year. Two replications of this basic design were conducted. In one replication (N = 61; 
51% women, average age = 25.3), the timing of the assumed graduation (and hence the initiation 
of the rental period) was manipulated experimentally via instructions. In the other replication (N 
= 47; 62% women, average age = 24.4), it was based on the students’ actual graduation.  
 Procedure. All participants were asked to imagine that they were about to graduate, had 
found a well-paying job, and were looking for a one-bedroom apartment to rent after graduation. 
In replication 1, graduation was said to take place either the next month (near-future condition) 
or in a year and one month (distant-future condition), which was consistent with the university 
calendar. In replication 2, participants were asked to consider the same scenario in the context of 
their own graduation, with half of them expecting to graduate the following month (near-future 
condition), and the other half expecting to graduate in a year and one month (distant-future 
condition). Note that all participants were asked to assume the same economic reality: searching 
for an apartment after landing a well-paying job just out of college. However, for some 
participants, this economic reality was to occur in a near future, whereas for other participants, 
this reality was to occur in a more distant future.  
All participants then reviewed the description of two one-bedroom apartments, each 
portrayed by five attributes and a picture of the apartment’s interior (see appendix A). In addition 
to the picture, which conveyed the apartment’s attractiveness and look, two of the five attributes 
were expected to vary the feelings associated with the apartment: the amount of natural light and 
the views from the apartment. The remaining three attributes were expected to manipulate the 
functional desirability of the apartment: the monthly rent, access to public transportation, and 
size. Apartment A was designed to be superior on the functional dimensions, whereas Apartment 
B was designed to be superior on the affective dimensions. 
The first dependent measure was participants’ relative preference for the two apartments, 
which was assessed on a 1 (strongly prefer apartment A) to 7 (strongly prefer apartment B) scale, 
with higher scores indicating a relative preference for the affectively superior option. The second 
dependent measure was participants’ choice between the two apartments. It was predicted that 
 relative preference for and choice of the affectively superior apartment would be greater in the 
near-future condition than in the distant-future condition. 
In replication 1, as a check of the manipulation of temporal proximity of the outcome, 
participants were asked to rate the time period that they focused on, using two 9-point items 
anchored at “next month/one year from now” and “the very near/very distant future” (α = .82). 
To assess potential confounds, participants were asked to rate their task involvement on three 9-
point agree-disagree items (e.g., “I went through the choices as if I was really choosing an 
apartment rental”; α = .87), and to rate their mood on five 9-point items (e.g., “good/bad,” 
“unpleasant/pleasant”; α = .95). 
To gain some insight about the process underlying the expected findings, in replication 2 
participants were asked to indicate how they made their decisions on two 7-point agree-disagree 
items: (a) “I made my decision of which apartment to rent based on how I would feel toward 
living in the apartments” and (b) “I made my decision of which apartment to rent based on the 
logical balance of pros and cons of living in the apartments.” Responses to these two items were 
combined into a composite scale in which higher scores indicated greater reliance on feelings 
and lower scores indicated greater reliance on logical assessments. 
Pilot Test of the Task Stimuli. To verify that the stimuli manipulated the affective and 
functional superiority of the apartments as intended, an independent group of 42 participants 
from the same population were asked to evaluate the two apartments either (a) based on reasons 
and logical assessments or (b) based on feelings (Pham et al. 2001). As expected, compared to 
participants who were instructed to rely on reasons, participants who were instructed to rely on 
their feelings had higher relative preferences for the affectively superior apartment (3.04 vs. 4.70; 
F(1, 40) = 6.55, p < . 02) and were more likely to choose this apartment over the functionally 
 superior apartment (55.0% vs. 13.6%; Z = 3.11, p < .01). Thus, the relative preferences between 
the two apartments can be seen as indicative of a differential reliance on feelings versus reasons.  
Results 
Preliminary Analyses. None of the participants in replication 1 guessed the hypothesis of 
the study correctly. (No demand check was included in replication 2 because there was no 
explicit manipulation.) As expected, participants in replication 1 reported a greater focus on the 
future in the distant-future condition (M = 5.30) than in the near-future condition (M = 3.50; F(1, 
55) = 7.92, p < .01). The outcome proximity manipulation did not influence participants’ level of 
involvement and mood (Fs < 1).  
Relative Preference and Choice. As predicted and summarized in Table 2, in both 
replications participants exhibited a stronger relative preference for the affectively superior 
apartment in the near-future condition than in the distant-future condition (replication 1: F(1, 55) 
= 5.85, p < .02; replication 2: F(1, 45) = 8.92, p < .01). Participants were also more likely to 
choose the affectively superior apartment in the near-future condition than in the distant-future 
condition (replication 1: Z = 1.96, p = .05; replication 2: Z = 1.98, p < .05). These results are 
consistent with the notion that even when the target information is held constant (all participants 
received the same apartment information), people are more likely to rely on affective inputs 
when the outcome is proximate than when it is temporally more distant. Consistent with this 
interpretation, the process measure included in replication 2 indicates that participants who 
expected to graduate in one month reported a marginally greater reliance on feelings (as opposed 
to logical assessments) compared to participants who expected to graduate the following year 
(F(1, 45) = 3.71, p = .06).  
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 Discussion 
Across two replications of the study, using different operationalizations of outcome 
proximity, we found that participants given a choice between an affectively superior option and a 
functionally superior option exhibited a stronger relative preference for the affectively superior 
option when the outcome was framed in a near future than when it was framed in a more distant 
future. In addition, participants reported a stronger reliance on feelings when the outcome was 
proximate than when it was more distant. These findings provide preliminary support for the 
proposition that even if the stimulus information is held constant, people are more influenced by 
the affective value of the options when the decision outcome is close to the present than when it 
is further away in the future.  
Note that while these findings may be reminiscent of previous findings on affect-
triggered myopia and on variations in affect intensity over time, they differ from previous in 
important respects. First, in this study the effects did not involve any intertemporal tradeoffs (e.g., 
choosing between a smaller reward now vs. a greater reward later). Second, in this study it is not 
the timing of the judgment that varied across conditions (e.g., making a decision to speak in 
public either immediately before the event or a week before the event), it is the timing of the 
outcome associated with the judgment or decision (choosing today an apartment to be rented in a 
month or to be rented in a year).    
One limitation of this study relates to the fact that affect was manipulated somewhat 
indirectly by varying the information provided across targets. It is possible that observed 
variations in preferences across conditions were driven not by a differential reliance on affect but 
by some other unobserved aspect(s) of the information provided across options. To address this 
 issue, in the subsequent experiments we employ a more direct manipulation of affect, one that 
allows us to hold the information about the target constant.   
EXPERIMENT 2: INFLUENCE OF INCIDENTAL FEELINGS FOR NEAR- VERSUS 
DISTANT-FUTURE OUTCOMES 
The purpose of this second study was to extend experiment 1’s findings and provide more 
direct evidence that temporal proximity of the outcome increases the reliance on affect in 
judgments and decisions. Unlike in the first experiment, in this second experiment all the 
information about the target was held constant, and affect was manipulated by varying 
participants’ mood. Given that incidental feelings from preexisting mood states are often 
misattributed to the target object (Schwarz and Clore 2007; Gorn, Goldberg, and Basu 1993), 
varying participants’ incidental moods allows us to manipulate how they feel toward the target 
while holding the target information constant (Pham 1998).  
In this study, participants whose mood states were manipulated through a supposedly 
unrelated task were asked to evaluate whether they would rent a given apartment after graduating. 
As in experiment 1, for half of the participants the graduation was set to take place in the near 
future, and for the other half it was set to take place in a more distant future. It was predicted that 
participants’ incidental moods would exert a stronger mood-congruent influence in the near-
future condition than in the distant-future condition.  
Method 
Design. A total of 104 participants (56% women, average age = 23.3) were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions of a 2 (positive mood vs. negative mood) × 2 (near- vs. 
distant-future outcome) between-subjects design.  
 Procedure. The experiment was administered as two supposedly unrelated studies. In the 
“first” study, participants’ mood states were manipulated as in Avnet, Pham, and Stephen (2012, 
study 6). Under the pretense of studying people’s ability to comprehend the gist of short video 
clips, participants were asked to watch and rate two movie clips. The first was neutral and 
common across conditions. The second was either an excerpt from a stand-up comedy 
performance (positive-mood condition) or edited scenes from a sad movie (negative-mood 
condition). After viewing each clip, participants answered a series of comprehension questions 
designed to reinforce the cover story.  
Although this manipulation had already been tested by Avnet and colleagues (2012), we 
further tested it in another pretest among 50 participants. After viewing either set of clips, pretest 
participants rated their moods on six 7-point items (e.g., “unhappy/happy,” “bad/good,” 
“unpleasant/pleasant”; α = .98). As expected, participants who had watched the sad movie clip 
reported feeling less pleasant (M = 2.70) than participants who had watched the comedy clip (M 
= 4.89; F(1, 48) = 33.67, p < .0001). 
In the supposedly unrelated “second” study, participants were given a similar decision 
task as in experiment 1. They were asked to imagine that they were about to graduate and had 
been looking for an apartment after landing a well-paying job. For half of the participants, the 
graduation was set to take place “next month”; for the other half it was set to take place “next 
year.” Unlike in experiment 1, all participants were shown a single apartment, which was the 
affectively superior apartment in experiment 1. (The rationale for this methodological choice is 
explained in the discussion of this experiment.) As the main dependent measures, participants 
rated their intention to rent this apartment after graduation on a scale of 1 (definitely not rent) to 
9 (definitely rent), and indicated how much they would be willing to pay for monthly rent. 
 Participants then completed similar checks as in replication 1 of experiment 1, and provided 
some background information. 
Results 
Preliminary Checks. None of the participants correctly guessed the hypothesis of the 
study. As expected, participants reported a greater focus on the future in the distant-future 
condition (M = 6.36) than in the near-future condition (M = 4.17; F(1, 103) = 20.86, p < .0001); 
no other effects were significant (Fs < 1). As in experiment 1, participants’ self-reported 
involvement did not differ across conditions (all Fs < 1). 
Behavioral Intention and Willingness to Pay. If proximity to the present encourages a 
greater reliance on feelings in judgments and decisions, evaluations of the target apartment 
should be more influenced by participants’ mood states in the near-future condition than in the 
distant-future condition. Consistent with this prediction, intentions to rent the apartment 
exhibited a significant mood × outcome proximity interaction (F(1, 103) = 5.93, p < .02). As 
illustrated in figure 1, participants’ mood states exerted a stronger mood-congruent influence on 
intentions in the near-future condition (MPositive = 5.28 vs. MNegative = 3.72; F(1, 103) = 7.14, p 
< .01) than in the distant-future condition (MPositive = 3.68 vs. MNegative = 4.12; F < 1). Neither of 
the main effects approached significance (both ps > .14).  
A similar interaction (F(1, 103) = 4.94, p < .03) emerged with participants’ willingness to 
pay: Participants’ moods had a stronger mood-congruent influence on their willingness to pay for 
rent in the near-future condition (MPositive = $1,916 vs. MNegative = $1,589; F(1, 103) = 5.35, p 
< .03) than in the distant-future condition (MPositive = $1,721 vs. MNegative = $1,840; F < 1). Main 
effects of mood and outcome proximity were again nonsignificant (both ps > .30).  
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 Discussion 
In this study, incidental mood states while evaluating a target were found to exert a 
stronger influence on evaluations of this target when the outcome of the decision was set in the 
near future than when it was set in a more distant future. This effect was found even though, 
unlike in experiment 1, the target information was held constant across conditions, supporting 
the interpretation that it is the influence of affect itself that increases with the temporal proximity 
of the outcome. These findings are consistent with the notion that feelings that are (here, 
mistakenly) attributed to the target are more likely to be relied upon in decisions whose 
outcomes are closer to the present than in comparable decisions whose outcomes are more 
distant.  
One may wonder whether the same effects would hold if instead of using experiment 1’s 
affectively superior option as the target, we had alternately used the functionally superior option. 
We believe that they would hold. However, this would need to be tested. It could be that the 
functionally superior but affectively inferior (drab-looking) apartment is seen as a plausible 
explanation for negative feelings but not for positive feelings. In this case, the simple effects may 
be driven more by the negative-mood condition than by the positive-mood condition. 
Alternatively, it is possible that evaluation of a functionally superior but affectively unattractive 
option prompts individuals to adopt a more utilitarian mindset, in which case feelings may not be 
used as information at all, even in the near-future condition (Pham 1998). Related issues are 
investigated in experiment 5.  
EXPERIMENT 3: INFLUENCE OF INCIDENTAL FEELINGS ON EVALUATIONS OF 
RECENT- VERSUS DISTANT-PAST PRODUCTS 
 In the first two experiments, the differential reliance on feelings in decisions as a function 
of temporal proximity was examined by comparing decisions whose outcomes were in a near 
future with decisions whose outcomes were in a more distant future. If affect is inherently a 
decision system of the present, then symmetric effects should be observed when comparing 
targets associated with a recent past to targets associated with a more distant past.  
Participants whose mood states were manipulated were asked to evaluate a set of video 
games that were associated either with a recent past or with a more distant past. If proximity to 
the present promotes a greater reliance on feelings as inputs to judgments and decisions, 
participants’ mood states should exert a stronger mood-congruent influence on their evaluations 
if the video games are associated with a recent past than if they are associated with a more 
distant past.  
Method 
Design. A total of 103 university students (51% women, average age = 22.9) were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions of a 2 (positive vs. negative mood) × 2 (recent past 
vs. distant past) between-subjects design.  
Procedure. The experiment was administered as two supposedly unrelated studies, with 
the “first” study manipulating participants’ moods as in experiment 2. The “second” study was 
allegedly about consumers’ evaluations of various media. Participants were asked to judge a 
team of video game designers based on a selection of games that the team had allegedly 
developed. As shown in appendix B, the games were common across conditions—Pong, Combat, 
and Duck Hunt—with each game illustrated by a screenshot and a brief description. In the 
recent-past condition the three games were described as having been created “recently…in 2007” 
(whereas the study was conducted at the beginning of 2008), and each game’s screenshot 
 involved sharp, contemporary-looking graphics. In the distant-past condition, the three games 
were described as having been created “in the early 1980s,” and the screenshots involved more 
basic, antiquated-looking graphics. The rest of the information was identical across conditions.  
As the main dependent measure, participants evaluated the set of games on five 7-point 
scales (e.g., “These games are good/not good”; “I like/do not like the games they developed”; α 
= .92). Additional questions assessed participants’ (a) levels of involvement (four 7-point agree-
disagree items such as “I found the task of evaluating these games very interesting”; α = .79); (b) 
moods (five 7-point items such as “bad/good”; α = .94); (c) guesses of the purpose of the study; 
and (d) background information (e.g., age and gender).  
Pilot Test of Product Stimuli. A pretest (N = 50) was conducted to verify that the two 
versions of the video games were associated with different temporal proximities. After 
participants had evaluated the games, the temporal proximity of these games was assessed with 
two measures. In the first measure, participants were asked to rate how long ago they thought the 
games had been released in the market using three 7-point items (e.g., “not that long ago/a long 
time ago”; α = .74). In the second measure, participants were asked to report the time period that 
they focused on when evaluating the games using another three 7-point items (e.g., “the very 
distant past/the very recent past”; α = .89). Compared to participants in the distant-past condition, 
participants in the recent-past condition perceived the games to have been released more recently 
(2.60 vs. 3.43; F(1, 48) = 5.62, p < . 03), and they reported focusing on a more recent period 
when evaluating the games (2.84 vs. 4.54; F(1, 48) = 21.61, p < . 0001).  
Results 
Preliminary Checks. Data from three participants who did not watch the mood-inducing 
videos and two participants who suspected a relationship between the two ostensibly unrelated 
 studies were removed, leaving 98 observations. As expected, the remaining participants reported 
feeling more pleasant in the positive-mood condition (M = 5.05) than in the negative-mood 
condition (M = 3.52; F(1, 94) = 32.83, p < .0001). There were no other effects of the 
manipulations on self-reported mood (ps > .22). In addition, participants’ self-reported 
involvement did not differ across conditions (all ps > .16).  
Evaluation. Consistent with previous findings on mood-congruent evaluation (e.g., Isen 
et al. 1978; Schwarz and Clore 1983), participants evaluated the games more favorably in the 
positive-mood condition (M = 4.70) than in the negative-mood condition (M = 3.97; F(1, 94) = 
7.93, p < .01). In addition, participants evaluated the games more favorably when led to believe 
that the games were created in the early 1980s (M = 5.21) than when led to believe that the 
games were created more recently (M = 3.42; F(1, 94) = 46.08, p < .0001). Participants may have 
been lenient toward games portrayed as created a long time ago than toward games portrayed as 
more recent. More central to this research, there was again an interaction between mood and 
temporal proximity (F(1, 94) = 4.11, p < .05). As illustrated in figure 2, when the games were 
associated with a more recent past, participants evaluated them more favorably if they were in a 
positive mood (M = 4.06) than if they were in a negative mood (M = 2.78; F(1, 94) = 11.49, p 
< .001). However, when the games were associated with a more distant past, participants gave 
comparable evaluations regardless of their moods (MPositive = 5.31 vs. MNegative = 5.10; F < 1). 
This interaction suggests that participants relied more on their momentary feelings in their 
evaluations when the target was related to a more recent past than when it was related to a more 
distant past.   
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
 Discussion 
This experiment extends the previous experiments’ findings by showing that the greater 
reliance on affect when outcomes are temporally proximate operates not only prospectively 
(when comparing a near vs. distant future) but also retrospectively (when comparing a recent vs. 
distant past). Specifically, it was found that participants’ moods had a stronger mood-congruent 
influence on their evaluations if the target was associated with a more recent past than if it was 
associated with a more distant past. This finding cannot be explained by a ceiling effect in the 
distant-past condition because nearly identical results were obtained when the data were 
reanalyzed using the method of successive intervals, which is largely insensitive to ceiling 
effects (Edwards and Thurstone 1952). This suggests that holding the intensity of the feelings 
constant, participants were still more likely to rely on their feelings when the target was 
perceived as more recent than when it was perceived as less recent. In other words, the same 
momentary feelings seem to be seen as more informative when evaluating targets associated with 
a recent past than when evaluating targets associated with a more distant past. As elaborated 
upon in the general discussion, this finding has important theoretical implications, clearly 
showing that the affective system is not merely an impatient system (that favors the present over 
the future), it is a system inherently anchored in the present (that also favors the recent past over 
the more distant past).  
EXPERIMENT 4: INFLUENCE OF INCIDENTAL FEELINGS ON EVALUATIONS OF 
RECENT- VERSUS DISTANT-PAST EXPERIENCES  
The purpose of this experiment was to replicate the findings of experiment 3 conceptually, 
and to extend them to situations where people evaluate their own personal experiences as 
opposed to external products. Student participants were first asked to describe a spring-break 
 vacation from either a recent past or a distant past. Their incidental feelings were next 
manipulated through an ostensibly unrelated task. Participants were then asked to evaluate the 
spring-break vacation they had just described. If a more recent past increases the reliance on 
feelings compared to a more distant past, then participants’ incidental moods should have 
stronger influence on their evaluation of a recent spring break than on their evaluation of a more 
distant past spring break.  
Method 
Design. Eighty-two university students (51% women, average age = 24.3) were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions of a 2 (positive vs. negative mood) × 2 (recent past vs. distant 
past spring break) between-subjects design.  
Procedure. Under the guise of a study on how well people can remember significant 
personal events, all participants were asked to recall and describe a past spring-break vacation. In 
the recent-past condition, participants were asked to describe what they did on their most recent 
spring break. In the distant-past condition, participants were asked to describe what they did on 
their spring break two years earlier. To standardize the level of detail of the memories that 
participants described across conditions, all participants had to provide a description between 
130 and 180 words, which a pretest had shown to be a sensible length for such descriptions. Next, 
as a purported “distractor task,” participants were administered the same mood manipulation as 
used in experiments 2 and 3. The rationale for carrying out this mood manipulation after 
participants had described their spring break involved reducing the possibility that any effect of 
mood on evaluations could be due to mood-congruent recall (Isen et al. 1978).  
After their moods had been manipulated, participants were then presented with their own 
spring-break descriptions. They were asked to review their descriptions and evaluate their spring 
 break on seven 7-point items (e.g., “I did not have/I had a good time,” “It was 
disappointing/gratifying”; α = .97), which formed the main dependent measure. As manipulation 
checks, participants (a) rated their perception of the spring break as something that happened 
recently or a long time ago on three 7-point items (e.g., “just happened/long time ago”; α = .93); 
and (b) rated their mood after watching the video clips on five 7-point items (e.g., “bad/good”; α 
= .97). As confounding checks, participants were asked to (a) rate their level of involvement on 
two 7-point agree-disagree items (e.g., “I thought about my past spring vacation very carefully”; 
α =  .77); and (b) guess the purpose of the study. Participants also provided some background 
information.   
Results 
Preliminary Checks. When asked, none of the participants correctly guessed the 
hypothesis of the study. As expected, participants rated their spring break as having occurred 
longer ago in the distant-past condition (M = 4.36) than in the recent-past condition (M = 3.31; 
F(1, 78) = 6.18, p < .02). Interestingly, a main effect of mood indicated that the spring break 
seemed more recent in the positive-mood condition (M = 3.34) than in the negative-mood 
condition (M = 4.33; F(1, 78) = 5.40, p < .05). The interaction between mood and spring break 
proximity was not significant (F < 1). As expected, participants reported feeling more pleasant in 
the positive-mood condition (M = 5.38) than in the negative-mood condition (M = 2.57; F(1, 78) 
= 90.27, p < .0001); other effects were not significant (ps > .11). Finally, there was no significant 
effect on self-reported involvement (all ps > .14).  
A preliminary review of participants’ description of their spring break revealed 
substantial variation in how their time was spent. To account for this heterogeneity in 
experiences, two independent judges coded participants’ descriptions into one of three categories: 
 (a) “went somewhere for spring break” (59.03%), (b) “stayed at home for spring break” 
(26.51%), and (c) “worked during spring break” (14.46%; κ = 0.87, disagreement resolved by a 
third judge). Because this categorical measure was understandably correlated with participants’ 
evaluations of their spring breaks (F(2, 80) = 14.40, p < .0001), it was controlled for as a 
covariate in the main analyses.  
 Evaluation. An ANCOVA of participants’ evaluations of their spring break, controlling 
for how they occupied their spring break, uncovered no main effects of mood or spring break 
proximity (ps > .23). However, as predicted, the analysis revealed a mood × spring break 
proximity interaction (F(1, 76) = 4.21, p < .05). As illustrated in figure 3, participants’ moods 
had a stronger mood-congruent influence on their evaluations of the spring break when it was 
recent (MPositive = 5.87 vs. MNegative = 4.78; F(1, 76) = 4.28, p < .05) than when it was more distant 
(MPositive = 4.72 vs. MNegative = 5.03; F < 1). Therefore, paralleling the results of experiment 3, 
participants appeared to rely more on their momentary feelings to evaluate a recent personal 
event than to evaluate a more distant event.  
[Insert figure 3 about here] 
Discussion 
Experiment 4’s results converge with those of experiment 3 in documenting a greater 
influence of incidental moods in evaluations related to a more recent past than in comparable 
evaluations related to a more distant past. Whereas in experiment 3 this effect was observed in 
evaluations of an external object (video games), in this experiment the effect was replicated in 
evaluations of an autobiographical experience. It seems unlikely that these effects are due to 
mood-congruent recall because: (a) in this experiment, mood was manipulated after participants 
were asked to recall and describe their experiences; and (b) in experiment 3 the target 
 information was externally provided, leaving little room for a differential recall explanation to be 
operative (see Bakamitsos 2006). Instead, we believe that these effects arise because proximity 
to the present increases the perceived informativeness of one’s affective feelings and therefore 
the reliance on these feelings in judgments and decisions.  
An alternative explanation for these results (and those of experiment 3) is that temporal 
distance into the past decreases the weight not just of affective inputs but of any judgment input. 
To test this rival explanation, two independent judges (who were blind to the study conditions 
and hypothesis) were asked to rate the evaluative content of each participant’s description of 
their spring break on a three-point scale (-1 = negative, 0 = neutral, +1 = positive). These ratings 
(r = .82) were averaged into an index of the evaluative quality of participants’ recalled spring 
breaks. We then performed an ANCOVA of participants’ overall evaluations of their spring 
breaks similar to the one reported above, but with two additional predictors: (a) the evaluative 
quality of the spring break, and (b) the interaction between this evaluative quality and the 
temporal proximity of the spring break. Obviously, the evaluative quality of the spring breaks 
should predict their overall evaluation. However, if temporal distance decreases the weight 
attached to any judgment input, the interaction between evaluative quality and temporal 
proximity of the spring break should be significant. The results show, however, that while 
evaluative quality was a significant predictor of overall evaluation (b = 1.396, t = 6.79, p 
< .0001), its interaction with temporal distance was not significant (t = -.03, NS). (The other 
results remain the same as in the main analysis.) Therefore, temporal distance did not seem to 
decrease the weight of every input in participants’ evaluations, it seemed to decrease only the 
weight attached to participants’ moods.    
 To recap, across four experiments we consistently found that proximity to the present 
increases the influence of affect in judgments and decisions. This effect was found both (a) 
prospectively, when comparing a near-future versus a distant-future outcome, and (b) 
retrospectively, when comparing targets associated with a recent past versus distant past. In the 
next experiment, we investigate the possibility that this phenomenon is due to the perceived 
informativeness of feelings in judgments as a function of temporal proximity.  
EXPERIMENT 5: INFORMATION VALUE OF AFFECT WITH NEAR- VERSUS DISTANT-
FUTURE OUTCOMES  
The first four experiments provide consistent evidence of a differential influence of 
affective feelings in judgments and decisions depending on the temporal proximity of the 
outcome or target. Given that all participants made their judgments at the same time and that the 
target information was held constant across conditions of temporal proximity, we assume that 
these findings were not driven by a differential intensity of feelings across temporal conditions, 
but rather by a differential reliance on feelings across temporal conditions. The purpose of this 
fifth experiment is to provide more direct evidence that temporal proximity does increase the 
reliance on feelings independently of their intensity, and it does so because of the perceived 
information value (relevance) of feelings when outcomes and targets are closer to the present.  
Previous research has shown that one of the main determinants of the perceived 
information value of feelings—and hence the reliance on feelings—in judgments and decisions is 
the perceived relevance of these feelings with respect to the judgment at hand (Pham 1998; see 
Greifeneder et al. 2011, for a review). For example, in consumer decision making, feelings are 
perceived to be more informative when the motive for the consumption is experiential (e.g., 
watching a movie for leisure) than when the motive is instrumental (e.g., watching a movie for 
 professional or educational purposes). If the greater influence of affective feelings under 
temporal proximity is due to a higher perceived information value of feelings when outcomes 
and targets are proximate, this phenomenon should be moderated by the perceived relevance of 
the feelings. Temporal proximity is more likely to increase the influence of feelings when they 
are relevant for the judgment at hand than when feelings are less relevant.   
Participants whose mood states were independently manipulated were asked to assess 
their intention to attend a movie preview in either the near future or a more distant future. They 
were given either an experiential or instrumental motive to attend the preview. It was predicted 
that among participants with an experiential motive (for whom feelings are relevant), intentions 
would again be more mood-congruent in the near-future condition than in the distant-future 
condition, as was found in experiment 2. However, among participants with an instrumental 
motive (for whom feelings are less relevant), the effect would dissipate, and mood would have 
no influence on intentions in either the near-future or distant-future condition.  
Method 
Design. One hundred and forty-three students (49% women, average age = 21.7) were 
randomly assigned to one of eight conditions of a 2 (positive vs. negative mood) × 2 (near- vs. 
distant-future outcome) × 2 (experiential vs. instrumental motive) between-subjects design.  
Procedure. The experiment was administered as two purportedly unrelated studies. In the 
“first” study, participants’ momentary moods were manipulated by asking them to report an 
affectively-charged personal episode (Schwarz and Clore 1983). Under the guise of developing a 
new scale, participants were asked to write a vivid description of a recent event that made them 
feel either “really happy, joyful, or cheerful” (positive-mood condition) or “really angry, irritated, 
or annoyed” (negative-mood condition). 
 In the “second” study, participants were asked to assess their intention to attend a 
preview of a particular foreign movie at an independent film festival. All participants received 
the same movie description. As in Pham (1998), half of the participants were given an 
experiential motive for attending the movie preview; they were told that “After a long week of 
school and hard work, every student deserves some leisure time over the weekend.” Therefore, 
they may “want to take a break from school work and enjoy life, at least for a few hours.” The 
other half were given an instrumental motive for attending the preview; they were asked to 
assume that they could get extra course credit by writing a short paper about an independent film 
of their choice. A number of studies have shown that such instructions modify the perceived 
relevance of feelings and hence the reliance on feelings in judgment (Pham 1998; White and 
McFarland 2009; Yeung and Wyer 2004). To manipulate temporal proximity of the outcome, 
participants were told that the movie preview would occur either that evening (near-future 
condition) or in three weeks (distant-future condition). 
As the main dependent measure, participants were asked to state their intention to attend 
the movie preview on a scale of 1 (“I would definitely not go”) to 7 (“I would definitely go”). To 
check the mood manipulation, participants were asked to report how they were feeling as they 
completed the “first” study on five 7-point items (e.g., “bad/good,” “unpleasant/pleasant”; α 
= .97). A demand check and basic background information (e.g., gender, familiarity with the 
target movie) were also collected. 
Results  
Preliminary Analyses. Although none of the participants had heard of the target movie 
before the experiment, 12 had to be removed from the analyses for the following reasons: Two 
suspected a connection between the mood manipulation and the decision task; one did not 
 complete the main dependent measures; and nine indicated that they already had plans on the 
specified preview date. The analyses were based on the remaining 131 observations. As expected, 
participants who were asked to recall an event that made them “feel really good” reported being 
in a more pleasant mood (M = 5.68) than did those who were asked to recall an event that made 
them “feel really bad” (M = 3.00; F(1, 123) = 166.37, p < .0001); other effects were 
nonsignificant (all Fs < 1).  
 Behavioral Intention. A 2 (mood) × 2 (temporal proximity) × 2 (motive) ANOVA of 
participants’ stated intentions to attend the preview revealed a main effect of motive, whereby 
participants with an instrumental motive reported higher intention compared to participants with 
an experiential motive (5.63 vs. 4.93; F(1, 123) = 8.93, p < .01). More importantly, the analysis 
revealed a significant three-way interaction among mood, temporal proximity, and motive (F(1, 
123) = 5.90, p < .02), suggesting that the differential influence of feelings as a function of 
temporal proximity was itself contingent on the perceived relevance of the feelings for the task at 
hand (see figure 4). When the motive was experiential (and the feelings were relevant), there was 
a simple mood × temporal proximity interaction (F(1, 123) = 9.47, p < .003) indicating that 
intentions were mood-congruent in the near-future condition (MPositive = 5.68 vs. MNegative = 4.60; 
F(1, 123) = 4.62, p < .04), as predicted and consistent with experiment 2, but mood-incongruent 
in the distant-future condition (MPositive = 4.06 vs. MNegative = 5.17; F(1, 123) = 4.85, p < .03), 
which was not expected. In contrast, when the motive was instrumental (and the feelings were 
less relevant), none of the effects were significant (Fs < 1): There was no mood effect in either 
the near-future or distant-future condition. The fact that when feelings were less relevant, mood 
did not have any influence on intentions even in the near-future condition is consistent with the 
 idea that the reliance on feelings when outcomes are proximate is driven in part by the perceived 
information value of the feelings.  
Discussion 
The results seem to indicate that the increased influence of affect when outcomes are 
temporally proximate is itself dependent on the perceived information value of the feelings for 
the judgment at hand. When the consumption motive was experiential and feelings were relevant, 
participants’ mood had a mood-congruent influence on their behavioral intentions in the near-
future condition but not in the distant-future condition. In contrast, when the consumption motive 
was instrumental and feelings were less relevant, participants’ mood did not have any influence 
on their intentions in either the near-future or distant-future condition. In other words, temporal 
proximity seemed to increase the reliance on feelings when they were relevant but not when they 
were less relevant.  
Surprisingly, it was found that when the motive was experiential, participants’ intentions 
were in fact mood-incongruent in the distant-future condition—a contrast effect that was not 
observed in experiment 2. Although this particular finding was not originally expected, it is not 
entirely inconsistent with our conceptualization. Previous studies have shown that when people 
consciously attempt to exclude from their judgments contextual inputs (e.g., incidental feelings) 
that are readily accessible, they sometimes over-correct, resulting in a contrast effect in the final 
judgment (Martin, Seta, and Crelia 1990; Ottati and Isbell 1996; Schwarz and Bless 1992). It is 
therefore possible that when participants with an experiential motive attempted to disregard their 
otherwise relevant feelings in the distant-future condition, they over-corrected for the influence 
of their mood state, resulting in mood-incongruent intentions.    
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 A System of the Present 
Various streams of prior literature seem to point to a distinct orientation of the affective 
system toward the present. First, affect tends to be experienced more intensely in decisions 
whose outcomes are closer to the present. Second, certain emotional areas of the brain are 
uniquely engaged in decisions with immediate outcomes. And third, in intertemporal choice, 
affect tends to trigger impatience and myopia, resulting in preferences toward smaller but 
immediate rewards over larger but delayed rewards. We believe that these various phenomena all 
reflect different facets of a fundamental underlying property of the affective system: It is a 
system that is inherently anchored in the present (Pham 2004, 2007). Building on this general 
thesis, we advance a novel hypothesis about another, previously unrecognized facet of the 
affective system, which is a greater reliance on affective feelings in decisions whose outcomes or 
targets are closer to the present compared to decisions whose outcomes or targets are temporally 
more distant.     
Consistent with this hypothesis, it was found in experiment 1 that in a choice between an 
affectively superior option and a functionally superior option, preference for the former is greater 
when the outcome is set in a near future than when the outcome is set in a more distant future—
an effect found across two replications. This shift in relative preference as a function of outcome 
proximity is consistent with a greater reliance on affective inputs when outcomes are temporally 
proximate. Note that while this finding may be reminiscent of previous findings on affect-driven 
impatience in intertemporal choice and self-control situations, it is novel in that in experiment 1, 
unlike in previous studies, no intertemporal tradeoff or self-control dilemma was involved. 
Additional direct evidence that decision makers rely more on their feelings when 
outcomes are temporally proximate was found in experiment 2, which showed that incidental 
 moods exerted a stronger mood-congruent influence on intentions (and willingness to pay) when 
the outcome was set in a near future than when it was set in a more distant future. The finding 
that the same feelings—here, manipulated through participants’ incidental mood states—can 
have a differential influence on evaluations of a given target as a function of the temporal 
proximity of the associated outcome suggests that proximity to the present increases not just the 
intensity of feelings (their scale value) but also the reliance on these feelings (their weight) in 
judgments.  
Whereas in the first two experiments temporal proximity was operationalized by 
comparing a near future to a more distant future, in experiments 3 and 4 temporal proximity was 
operationalized by comparing a recent past to a more distant past. In these latter two experiments, 
it was found that incidental mood states exerted a stronger mood-congruent influence on 
evaluations when the target was associated with a recent past than when it was associated with a 
more distant past. Therefore, proximity to the present seems to increase the reliance on affect 
both compared to the future and compared to the past.  
Finally, it was found in experiment 5 that when feelings were presumably relevant, 
incidental mood states had a mood-congruent influence on behavioral intentions when the 
outcome was set in a near future but not when it was set in a distant future. In contrast, when 
feelings were presumably less relevant, mood states did not have any influence on behavioral 
intentions regardless of whether the outcome was in a near future or in a distant future. This 
dependency of the phenomenon on the perceived relevance of feelings is consistent with the 
interpretation that the phenomenon is at least partially related to a differential perceived 
informativeness of feelings when outcomes and targets are proximate versus distant.  
 Overall, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis of a greater reliance on 
affective feelings in judgments and decisions whose outcomes or targets are closer to the present. 
Support for this specific hypothesis in turn reinforces the more general thesis that the affective 
system of judgment and decision making is inherently a system of the present.  
Theoretical Elaborations and Speculations 
What Is “Close” and What Is “Far”? An obvious question about our theoretical 
proposition involves when an outcome or target is sufficiently close that it would increase the 
reliance on affect or sufficiently distant that it would decrease it. For example, would having 
dinner with friends next week qualify as a “near” future or as a “distant” future? Consistent with 
research on the psychophysics of time (Ekman and Lundberg 1971; Gescheider 1985), we 
believe that what matters in the phenomenon is not the absolute temporal distance of the 
outcome or target but its subjective distance. In particular, we suggest that outcomes and targets 
will appear temporally “close”—and trigger a greater reliance on affect—when their distance is 
less than the usual time horizon involved in decisions related to these outcomes and targets. 
Similarly, outcomes and targets will appear temporally “distant” when their distance exceeds the 
usual time horizon involved in decisions related to these outcomes and targets. For example, in 
deciding whether to see a new movie, two weeks will tend to be perceived as “distant” in time 
(see experiment 5), whereas in deciding whether to rent a given apartment, two weeks will tend 
to be perceived as “close” (see experiments 1 and 2).    
Relation to Socioemotional Selectivity Theory. It is interesting to relate our findings to 
other research in which time plays a central role. According to socioemotional selectivity theory 
(SEST), social motives tend to fall into two functional categories: (a) those related to the 
acquisition of knowledge, and (b) those related to the regulation of one’s emotional well-being 
 (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, and Charles 1999). SEST’s main proposition is that, over the life-span, 
people give different priority to these two classes of motives as a function of their perception of 
time. When time is perceived as plentiful and open-ended, people tend to adopt a longer-term 
perspective and favor knowledge acquisition (e.g., seeking career advice; undergoing diagnostic 
tests). In contrast, when time is perceived as limited and constrained, people tend to adopt a 
shorter-term perspective and focus on emotional well-being (e.g., planning the next vacation; 
soliciting a doctor’s reassurance). As a result, younger individuals, for whom time usually 
appears more plentiful, tend to focus on knowledge-related pursuits, whereas older individuals, 
who typically have less time left in life, tend to be more concerned with matters related to 
emotional well-being.    
Assuming that time may appear more limited and constrained when an outcome is set in a 
near future than when an outcome is set in a more distant future, one may argue that SEST could 
also account for the greater influence of affective feelings in decisions involving near-future 
outcomes that was observed in experiments 1 and 2. However, because in SEST the perception 
of time is defined mostly by how much one has left in life—that is, time is viewed from a 
forward-looking perspective—this theory would not account for the results of experiments 3 and 
4, which examined the effects of time from a backward-looking perspective.  
Relation to Construal Level Theory. It is also interesting to relate our theoretical 
propositions to those of construal level theory. As mentioned earlier, according to CLT, temporal 
distance should increase the relative weight attached to abstract and essential (“high-level”) 
features of the options, whereas temporal proximity should increase the relative weight attached 
to concrete and nonessential (“low-level”) features of the options. To the extent that affect tends 
to be more concrete, visceral, and context-specific (Epstein and Pacini 1999; Metcalfe and 
 Mischel 1999), our predictions would generally align with those of CLT. However, our 
predictions would depart from those of CLT in two situations. 
 First, an important proposition of CLT is that higher-level construal of the options 
promotes a focus on their desirability, whereas lower-level construal promotes a focus on their 
feasibility (Liberman and Trope 1998). As a result, temporal distance tends to increase the 
relative weight attached to the desirability of the options, whereas temporal proximity tends to 
increase the relative weight attached to their feasibility. If the desirability of an option is driven 
primarily by its affective value and its feasibility by its functional attributes, CLT would predict 
a greater weight of affect when outcomes are temporally distant than when they are proximate—
a prediction that would be opposite from ours. We believe, however, that one should not equate 
the desirability of an option with its affective value and the feasibility of an option with its 
functional attributes. Rather, desirability/feasibility and affective/functional value may be better 
conceptualized as distinct dimensions. For example, an option may be more or less desirable for 
functional reasons (e.g., the proximity of an apartment to grocery stores); similarly, an option 
may be more or less feasible for affective reasons (e.g., being too nervous to speak in public). 
Therefore, an interesting avenue for future research would be to test the effects of temporal 
proximity of the outcome in settings where the desirability versus feasibility of the options is 
varied independently from their affective versus functional value.  
Second, while affect generally tends to be concrete and “low-level,” according to CLT, 
sometimes affect can be an essential and therefore “high-level” characteristic of the target. In 
these situations, CLT would predict a greater weight of affect under increased temporal distance, 
which again would seem opposite to our general prediction. Interestingly, findings from our last 
experiment seem to be inconsistent with this particular prediction of CLT. Recall that in this 
 experiment, a high relevance of affect (due to experiential motives) seemed to increase the 
weight of affect under a proximate outcome compared to a distant outcome. Given that a high 
relevance of affect should have made it an essential aspect of the decision, one would have 
predicted based on CLT that the influence of affect would have increased, rather than decreased, 
with temporal distance when affect was highly relevant. Therefore, an important avenue for 
future research would be to better delineate the conditions under which the two theories’ 
respective predictions are likely to hold. We suspect that it may be useful to make a distinction 
between (a) a concrete and visceral kind of affect that consists of genuine affective experiences 
associated with a physiological response (e.g., the genuine feelings that one may experience 
when receiving a gift), and (b) a more abstract and mental kind of affect that consists of mere 
cognitive representations of affective responses with little physiological correlates (e.g., the 
belief that a particular gift would make someone happy) (see Bulbul and Menon 2010 and 
Robinson and Clore 2002, for related distinctions). The phenomenon and predictions described 
in our research pertain to the former, more basic kind of affect—the kind of affect that 
presumably guided our ancestors through our evolutionary history. The pattern predicted by CLT 
may be more likely to hold for the latter, more mental kind of affect (see Trope and Liberman 
2003, experiment 5).      
Generalizability across Feelings. While we suspect that the phenomenon does not extend 
to abstract kinds of affect, we speculate that within the realm of genuine feeling experiences, the 
phenomenon has broad generalizability. First, we believe that the greater reliance of affective 
feelings when outcomes and targets are proximate is not restricted to a particular valence of 
feelings. In other words, temporal proximity should increase the reliance on both positive and 
negative feelings in judgments and decisions. Consistent with this conjecture, there was little 
 evidence in our studies that the phenomenon was systematically more pronounced for either 
positive or negative feelings (see Van Boven et al. 2010 for related findings).  
 In addition, we speculate that the phenomenon extends to feelings that are not strictly 
affective, including “cognitive” feelings whose source lies in information processes (e.g., fluency, 
ease-of-retrieval, feeling-of-knowing) and “bodily” feelings (e.g., feelings of being tired, feelings 
of being cold). For example, we would predict that subjective experiences of fluency would have 
more influence on judgments of fame or truth when the target is temporally proximate than when 
it is temporally distant. Indeed, there is growing evidence that feelings tend to operate in a 
similar manner regardless of whether they are affective, cognitive, or bodily (Greifeneder et al. 
2011; see also Hong and Sun 2012).  
Generalizability across Dimensions of Psychological Distance. While our research 
focuses on the effect of time on the reliance on affect, we believe that similar effects would be 
observed with other variables beyond time that map onto the notion of psychological distance, 
such as space, social distance, and hypotheticality. What presumably triggers a greater reliance 
on affect is a proximity to the egocentric self in the “here and now.” Therefore, any departure (or 
distance) from this egocentric self—whether in time, space, social closeness, or reality—would 
tend to decrease the reliance on affect in judgments. Preliminary support for this conjecture 
comes from studies showing that (a) emotional involvement decreases as a function of physical 
distance (Bratfisch 1969; Stanley 1968); (b) affective intensity decreases as a function of 
perceived psychological distance (Van Boven et al. 2010); (c) the mere priming of physical 
distance decreases the influence of affect on judgments (Williams and Bargh 2008); and (d) 
affective feelings exert a stronger influence on judgments and decisions made for oneself than on 
 judgments and decisions made for someone else (Pronin et al. 2008; Raghunathan and Pham 
1999). 
 
In summary, our studies show that the reliance on affect increases with the temporal 
proximity of the outcome or target. As discussed in the preceding section, this finding has 
important theoretical implications and suggests numerous avenues for future research. More 
importantly, this finding helps substantiate a broader and more fundamental principle of the 
affective system: that it is inherently a judgment and decision-making system of the present. As 
reviewed in this paper, this basic principle helps integrate a wide variety of findings across 
various literatures (see Table 1). It additionally suggests the possibility of entirely new 
predictions. For example, building on this principle, Chang and Pham (2012) recently showed 
that the pervasive scope-insensitivity bias—a bias generally attributed to the operation of the 
affective system (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004)—is more pronounced when outcomes are 
temporally proximate than when they are temporally distant. This suggests that the entire 
affective system, including its associated biases, may be more engaged in the present.      
  
APPENDIX A 
 
 
Imagine that you are about to graduate next month [next year], after years of hard work in college, and 
that you have accepted a well-paying job in the city. You have been looking forward to this day, which will be in 
May 2007 [May 2008], envisioning how life would be like after your college graduation. In just a month [year], you 
will be starting a new chapter in your life.  
As your graduation is approaching next month [next year], you begin your apartment search process, 
looking for a one-bedroom apartment to rent after your graduation. You are considering the following two 
apartments that will be available by the time you graduate from college next month [next year]:  
  
 
 
Apartment A 
 
 
Apartment B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics of Apartment A: 
 Partial courtyard view 
 Single window in living room and small 
window in bedroom 
 Spacious closet space 
 630 sq. ft. 
 Steps from the subway  
 Monthly rent: $1,600 
 
Characteristics of Apartment B: 
 Breathtaking view from most rooms 
 Oversized windows with lots of sunlight 
 Limited closet space 
 450 sq. ft. 
 Four bus stops from the subway 
 Monthly rent: $2,300 
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TABLE 1 
PREVIOUS FINDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THE THESIS OF AFFECT AS A DECISION-MAKING SYSTEM OF THE PRESENT 
 
 (A) AFFECT IS EXPERIENCED MORE INTENSELY IN THE PRESENT 
  
 
 
(B) CERTAIN EMOTIONAL NEURAL AREAS OF THE BRAIN ARE DISTINCTLY ENGAGED IN DECISIONS WITH 
IMMEDIATE OUTCOMES 
 
 
 
(C) AFFECT TRIGGERS IMPATIENCE IN FOCAL DECISION TASK AND SUBSEQUENT, UNRELATED DECISION TASKS 
  
 
 
(D) STRONGER INFLUENCE OF AFFECT IN DECISIONS INVOLVING OUTCOMES CLOSE TO THE PRESENT 
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TABLE 2 
EFFECT OF TEMPORAL PROXIMITY OF GRADUATION ON PREFERENCE 
BETWEEN AFFECTIVELY AND FUNCTIONALLY SUPERIOR OPTIONS  
(EXPERIMENT 1; N = 104)  
 
 Replication 1 Replication 2 
  Near Future 
(n = 29) 
Distant Future 
(n = 28) 
Near Future 
(n = 20) 
Distant Future 
(n = 27) 
Relative 
preference for 
affectively 
superior apartment 
3.45 2.25 3.20 1.81 
Choice of 
affectively 
superior apartment 
31.01% 10.71% 30.00% 7.40% 
Relative reliance 
on feelings vs. 
logical 
assessments 
— — 3.20 1.63 
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FIGURE 1 
EFFECT OF TEMPORAL PROXIMITY OF GRADUATION AND MOOD ON 
INTENTION TO RENT AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY  
(EXPERIMENT 2; N = 104)  
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FIGURE 2 
EFFECT OF TEMPORAL PROXIMITY OF VIDEO GAME RELEASE AND 
MOOD ON VIDEO GAME EVALUATIONS (EXPERIMENT 3; N = 98) 
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FIGURE 3 
EFFECT OF TEMPORAL PROXIMITY OF RECALLED SPRING BREAK AND 
MOOD ON EVALUATION OF SPRING BREAK (EXPERIMENT 4; N = 98) 
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FIGURE 4 
 
EFFECT OF TEMPORAL PROXIMITY OF MOVIE PREVIEW, MOOD, AND 
MOTIVE ON INTENTION TO WATCH A MOVIE (EXPERIMENT 5; N = 131) 
 
(A) EXPERIENTIAL MOTIVE (N = 68) 
 
 
(B) INSTRUMENTAL MOTIVE (N = 63)  
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